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Abstract
This paper proposes a new Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model
with credit frictions and a banking sector, which endogenizes loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios of households and banks by expressing them as a function of systemic and
idiosyncratic proxies for risk. Moreover, the model features endogenous balance
sheet choices and a novel formulation of the targeted leverage ratio, in which as-
sets are risk-weighted by risk-sensitivity measures. The results highlighted in this
paper are important along two dimensions. First of all, the presence of endogenous
LTV ratios exacerbates the procyclicality of lending conditions. Second, the model
contributes to deeper understand the role of prudential regulatory frameworks in
affecting business cycle fluctuations and in restoring macroeconomic and financial
stability. The results suggest that when the economy is severely stressed by shocks
originating in the financial sector, prudential regimes such as Basel II and Basel III
are capable of downsizing substantially aggregate volatility, with Basel III found
to be significantly more effective than Basel II.
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1 Introduction
Until the early 2000s, large-scale structural macro models, such as Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, have often neglected financial and credit dynam-
ics, with a few notable exceptions (Christiano et al., 2003). Most of the policy models
currently employed by central banks (Smets and Wouters, 2003; Christiano et al., 2005;
Christoffel et al., 2008) either assume frictionless financial markets or lack a realistic and
comprehensive representation of the financial sector.
The recent growing interaction between the real economy and financial markets along
with the emergence of several questions linked to financial stability, macro-prudential
regulations and monetary policy, has provided a strong motivation to create fully artic-
ulated macroeconomic models describing the role of financial frictions and structures in
a modern market economy. As the recent global downturn unfolded, the necessity of
reforming standard macro models along these lines has become even more urgent.
However, the literature on macroeconomic modeling and that regarding financial and
credit market imperfections have run for a long time on parallel paths without converg-
ing.1 As for the latter, it has long been recognized that financial markets are highly
imperfect (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders, costly state verification issues, and the eventuality of
bankruptcies, defaults and contagions, are the main factors that may potentially disrupt
the smooth working of financial and credit markets. It follows that agents are not able
to perfectly smooth consumption in reaction to shocks, and business cycle fluctuations
are likely to be amplified.
This financial accelerator effect, whereby shocks to the net worth of agents have
procyclical effects on their borrowing capacity, amplifying, in such a way, business cycle
fluctuations, has been first formalized by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and subsequently
incorporated into structural macroeconomic models by Bernanke et al. (1996, 1999) and
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In the first case, the so-called costly state verification setting,
1The following literature review is far from being exhaustive. For a comprehensive survey, see Roger
and Vlcek (2012).
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the financial accelerator effect occurs because the premium on external financing, which
depends on the net worth, is procyclical, implying that economic disturbances influence
the borrowing capacity of agents. In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the amplification of
business cycles’ magnitude and persistence arises because of the dynamic interactions
between borrowing limits and asset prices, generated by explicitly modeling collateral for
loans.
Frictions relying on the costly state verification and default risk a` la Bernanke et al.
(1999) and limited enforceability and collateralized debt a` la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
have been recently employed to enrich standard DSGE models (Aoki et al., 2004; Gertler
et al., 2007; Christensen and Dib, 2008; Iacoviello, 2005; Iacoviello and Neri, 2010; Lom-
bardo and McAdam, 2012).2
Most of the earlier macroeconomics literature imposed financial frictions on non-
financial borrowers, treating financial intermediaries as a veil. Modeling financial in-
termediaries entails the presence of a more or less structured bank’s balance sheet, which
establishes a link between banking activity and the macroeconomy. Some recent models
with financial intermediaries emphasize the demand side of credit, i.e. a perfectly com-
petitive banking sector accommodates any changes in the demand for credit coming from
households and firms (Christiano et al., 2003, 2008, 2010).
Another strand of the literature captures supply side aspects of credit dynamics by
introducing a more realistic representation of financial intermediaries. First of all, the
work by Gerali et al. (2010) paved the way to a flourishing literature that models banks
with a certain degree of market power (Dib, 2010; Andre´s and Arce, 2012). In Gerali
et al. (2010), banks, by operating in monopolistically competitive markets, impose interest
rates on loans and deposits that are, respectively, policy rate markups and markdowns.
This amplifies the effect of policy rate movements for borrowers, and attenuates those for
lenders. Therefore, the transmission mechanisms of shocks are richer in comparison with
standard models.
2Recent extensions to these settings try to introduce endogenous default (Forlati and Lambertini,
2011), and substantial non-linearities to generate “occasionally binding” collateral constraints (Mendoza,
2010).
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A second important element is the presence of bank capital and, in particular, capital
requirements for banking activity. Bank capital requirements are usually imposed to
limit the moral hazard on the part of banks arising with deposit insurance. However,
capital requirements are costly because they reduce the possibility for banks to create
liquidity. Meh and Moran (2010) introduce bank capital to model moral hazard problems
between borrowers and investors. In other contributions (den Heuvel, 2008; Angeloni
and Faia, 2013; Zhang, 2009; Dib, 2010; Gerali et al., 2010; Age´nor et al., 2012; Angelini
et al., 2012), bank capital is motivated by regulatory requirements. In fact, recent events
have strengthened the role of the so-called “prudential” policies, namely policies that,
focusing on the interactions between financial institutions, markets and the business cycle,
aim at mitigating the impact of financial fluctuations.3 Usual instruments of macro-
prudential policies are countercyclical capital and liquidity requirements, and loan-to-
value (LTV) ratios. Modeling bank capital requirements allows economists: a) to analyze
the macroeconomic impact of regulations (e.g. how regulatory instruments can attenuate
the tendency of the economy to over-leverage during booms and deleverage during busts);4
b) to better capture the effect of shocks originating in financial markets; c) to study how
the transmission of shocks is altered depending on the strength of the financial sector,
and, in particular, how macro-prudential and monetary policies can be coordinated and
combined effectively.5
Within this research area, Angelini et al. (2012), by adapting the model by Gerali
et al. (2010), analyze the strategic interaction between macro-prudential policies and
monetary policy. They consider two types of interaction between monetary and regulatory
authorities: cooperative and non-cooperative interaction. Their results suggest that when
the economy is hit by supply shocks (i.e. in normal times), macro-prudential policies
have limited effect on macroeconomic stability. By contrast, when the economy is hit by
3Prudential policies are, for example, provided for by the Basel Accords. For an extensive and updated
review on prudential policies see Beau et al. (2012) and Galati and Moessner (2012).
4There is indeed strong empirical evidence that bank leverage is strongly procyclical (Adrian and
Shin, 2010b).
5As stressed by Beau et al. (2012), the reason for the close link between macro-prudential and mon-
etary policies is that they work through the same transmission channels, such as the bank lending and
the balance sheet channels.
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financial shocks (i.e. in extraordinary times), macro-prudential policies help to stabilize
macroeconomic fluctuations, and cooperation with monetary policy plays an important
role in strengthening this effect.
By embracing the supply side approach in modeling the banking sector, this paper
proposes a new DSGE model able to analyze the interconnections between financial mar-
kets and the macroeconomy. In particular, we adopt some of the elements present at
the frontiers of research, highlighted above, and add to them. First of all, in line with
some existing contributions in the literature, the model exhibits financially constrained
households a` la Iacoviello (2005), whose capacity to borrow is tied to the value of their
real estate holdings, and a rich banks’ balance sheet representation including deposits,
loans to households, government bonds, loans from the central bank, and bank’s equity.
Hence, balance sheet choices are totally endogenous and the model features procyclical
leverage.
Second, this leverage procyclicality is strengthened by the presence of proxies for
measured risk, which are expressed in a novel formulation. While most of the existing
general equilibrium models assume constant LTV ratios, empirical evidence shows that
this value varies substantially over time, also reflecting movements in risk perception
in financial markets (Gruss and Sgherri, 2009; Campbell and Cocco, 2011).6 Partially
drawing on Angelini et al. (2012), our setting endogenizes LTV ratios by expressing
them as a function of proxies for both systemic and idiosyncratic risk, both at the level
of households and banks.7 Moreover, we propose a novel formulation of the targeted
leverage ratio, in which assets are risk-weighted by cyclical risk-sensitivity measures.8
Inspired by the empirical evidence suggesting that procyclical leverage affects aggregate
volatility and particularly the price of risk (Adrian and Shin, 2010b), the proxies for risk
perception and the risk-sensitivity measures depend, inter alia, on the leverage conditions
6Furthermore, LTV ratios vary significantly also across countries, reflecting differences in legal and
regulatory frameworks (Calza et al., 2007).
7Endogenous LTV ratios have also been proposed by Lambertini et al. (2011). In this model, the
endogenous LTV is derived based on an agency problem between lenders and borrowers.
8A similar formulation is proposed by Age´nor et al. (2012), who relate instead the risk-measures to
the repayment probability.
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of households and banks.
The new role for risk combined with endogenous balance sheet choices, allows us,
among the other things, to better analyze how financial intermediaries affect the conduct
of monetary policy, and, in particular, to isolate the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy described by Adrian and Shin (2010a). According to this channel, monetary policy
actions affect the risk-taking capacity of banks, leading to shifts in the supply of credit.
Third, banks are subjected to the standard tool used by regulatory authorities, i.e.
capital requirements. The innovative formulation of the targeted leverage ratio includes
two types of banking assets, namely loans to households and government bonds. As
already stressed, the targeted leverage ratio presents an endogenous source of risk per-
ception that differs among asset classes. Since both loans to households and government
bonds are considered risky assets, the model is particularly suitable to investigate in a
realistic way the effectiveness of different prudential regimes.
A fourth key peculiarity of the model is the presence of a structured connection be-
tween financial intermediaries and the monetary authority in order to better capture mon-
etary policy transmission dynamics. We do this by introducing financially constrained
banks besides financially constrained households. More specifically, the amount of loans
that banks can receive from the central bank is subject to a collateralized borrowing
constraint. Loans to households and government bonds are assumed to be employed
as collateral by banks. These features aim at reproducing the lending facilities usually
offered by monetary authorities to banks.
In light of the novelties introduced, our model represents a unique instrument for sim-
ulating, within a general equilibrium framework, credit crunch dynamics and analyzing
the effect of prudential regulatory measures. The results highlighted in the paper are
important along two dimensions. First, the model provides new insights on the interac-
tions between the banking and credit sectors and the rest of the economy. Second, and
more importantly, it contributes to deeper understand the role of supervisory authori-
ties in affecting business cycle fluctuations and in restoring macroeconomic and financial
stability.
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More precisely, our findings suggest that the presence of endogenous LTV ratios exac-
erbates the severity of a simulated credit crunch, and, more generally, the procyclicality
of lending conditions, in comparison with a baseline model without these features, and it
is thus able to reproduce the salient facts of the recent financial crisis. Endogenous risk
weights and LTV ratios are capable of affecting substantially lending quantities, due to
the interaction between: a) movements in the LTV ratios, due to changes in labor market-
and macroeconomic conditions; b) movements in the weighted leverage cost, due to the
combination of changes in interest rates and housing prices, which affect the perception
of risk associated with mortgage assets held by banks.
Lastly, by modifying the configuration of the key parameters and steady-states of
the model, we are able to compare different prudential policy regimes, such as the Basel
Accords. The results suggest that when the economy is mainly affected by standard
macroeconomic shocks (normal times), prudential regulatory regimes like Basel II and
Basel III increase the volatility of macroeconomic and credit variables. By contrast, when
the economy is severely stressed by shocks originating in the financial sector (extraordi-
nary times), these regimes are capable of downsizing substantially aggregate volatility,
making business cycle fluctuations smoother, with Basel III found to be significantly
more effective than Basel II.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates the model
and introduces its key features. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
A stylized representation of the model economy is sketched in Figure 1. The economy
is populated by two types of households, namely constrained and unconstrained house-
holds. Constrained households supply labor inputs and accumulate housing stock, while
unconstrained households supply capital inputs. Monopolistically competitive firms hire
labor and capital to produce differentiated goods. The two groups of households exhibit a
different discount factor, i.e. they discount differently the stream of future utility, which
ensures positive financial flows in equilibrium. Thus, constrained households borrow a
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positive amount of loans from banks, whereas unconstrained households invest their re-
sources by purchasing positive amounts of deposits and zero-coupon government bonds.
The availability of loans to constrained households is subject to a borrowing constraint
linked to the market value of their housing stock. Banks operate in a perfect competitive
market. The asset side of their balance sheet is composed of government bonds and loans
to households. They are assumed to purchase government bonds. Loans to households
and purchases of government bonds are financed by collection of deposits, net worth,
and loans from the central bank collateralized against banks’ asset holdings.9 Lastly, a
consolidated government-central bank conducts: a) a standard passive fiscal policy; b)
a standard monetary policy consisting in setting the policy rate via a Taylor rule; c) a
monetary policy involving the lending facility for banks.
2.1 Constrained Households
Preferences of the representative constrained household are defined over consumption
CCt , real money balances
MCt
Pt
, hours worked Ft, and real stock of housing
Ht
Pt
, and are
described by the infinite stream of utility:
UCt =
∞∑
t=0
βtCu
C
(
CCt ,
MCt
Pt
, Ft,
Ht
Pt
)
(1)
where βC is the intertemporal discount factor.
The instantaneous utility function of the representative constrained household uC
(
CCt ,
MCt
Pt
, Ft,
Ht
Pt
)
is given by:
uC
(
CCt ,
MCt
Pt
, Ft,
Ht
Pt
)
=
(CCt − γCCt−1)1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
+
1
1− χ
(
MCt
Pt
)1−χ
− Ψ
1 + 1/ψ
F
1+1/ψ
t +J
h log
Ht
Pt
(2)
where γ measures the importance of consumption habits, σ is the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution, χ is the elasticity of money demand, and ψ is the Frisch elasticity of
9This is a sort of discount window offered by the monetary authority to banks.
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labor supply.
In this economy, each agent (both constrained and unconstrained) can choose the
composition of a basket of differentiated final goods. Preferences across varieties of goods
have the standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form a` la Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977):
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
θt−1
θt dj
] θt
θt−1
(3)
where Ct is the aggregate consumption index of all the differentiated final goods produced
in the economy under monopolistic competition. There are j-th varieties of final goods
(j ∈ [0, 1]), and θ is the elasticity of substitution between different final goods varieties
(θ > 1).
Each constrained agent is subject to the following budget constraint:
CCt +
PHt Ht
Pt
+
LCt−1R
C
t−1
Pt
+
MCt
Pt
+ TCt =
MCt−1
Pt
+
LCt
Pt
+ wtFt +
PHt−1Ht−1
Pt
(4)
Constrained agents allocate their wealth among money holding MCt and housing Ht,
where PHt is the price of houses. They receive wage income wtFt, where wt is the real
wage (hereafter, lower-case letters denote real variables). They also pay a real lump-sum
tax TCt . Constrained households borrow from banks an amount of loans L
C
t at the interest
rate RCt . Pt is the aggregate price level. The housing stock is assumed to be fixed. A
shock to the house price level, νHt , is introduced. It follows an AR(1) process with an
i.i.d. disturbance εP
H
t with zero mean and standard deviation σPH .
Moreover, each constrained household is also subject to the following borrowing con-
straint:
LCt R
C
t
Pt
≤ LTV Ct Et
[
PHt+1Ht
Pt+1
]
(5)
Thus, constrained households can borrow from banks, but the expected value of their
housing stock must guarantee repayment of loans and interests, as in Iacoviello (2005) and
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Iacoviello and Neri (2010). LTV Ct is the loan-to-value ratio of the constrained agent and
reflects the preferences of banks. As stressed by Gerali et al. (2010), from a microeconomic
point of view it can be interpreted as the cost of collateral repossession for banks in case
of default. Differently from most of previous studies, which assume an exogenous LTV
ratio, LTV Ct is determined endogenously by the following equation:
LTV Ct
LTV C
=
(
LTV Ct−1
LTV C
)φ
LTV C
(
PHt Ht
PHH
)ϕ1,H (wtFt
wF
)ϕ2,H (Yt
Y
)ϕ3,H
exp
(
εLTV
C
t
)
(6)
where variables without the temporal subscript denote steady-state values. φLTV C is an
autoregressive parameter, 0 < φLTV C < 1, to model sluggish LTV changes over time.
εLTV
C
t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and standard deviation σLTV C . In the right-hand
side of (6) we can distinguish other three terms. The first term represents the variation
in the value of the stock of houses held by constrained households relative to its steady-
state value, and it is a proxy for the value of the collateral. The second term measures
variations in the labor income of constrained households relative to its steady-state value
to capture the risk related to households’ income fluctuations. We then add a component
associated with fluctuations of output around its steady-state level: it is a proxy for the
systemic risk of the economy. It is assumed that ϕ1,H ,ϕ2,H ,ϕ3,H ≥ 0, i.e. increases in the
value of the stock of houses, real labor income, and aggregate income, lead to an increase
in the LTV ratio, allowing constrained households to expand their borrowing capacity.
Thanks to this formulation, we are able to endogenize the amount of credit that banks
provide to constrained households given the value of their collateral.
Constrained households maximize their lifetime utility (1), subject to the budget
constraint (4) and the borrowing constraint (5). The first order necessary conditions
with respect to consumption, labor, money, houses, and loans are respectively given by:
(CCt − γCCt−1)−1/σ − βCγEt
[
(CCt+1 − γCCt )−1/σ
]
= λCt (7)
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ΨF
1/ψ
t = λ
C
t wt − Et
[
µCt ϕ2,HLTV
C
t P
H
t+1
pit+1
]
(8)
(
mCt
)−χ
+ βCEt
[
λCt+1
pit+1
]
= λCt (9)
Jh
ht
= λCt P
H
t −Et
[
βCλ
C
t+1P
H
t
pit+1
]
−Et
[
µCt LTV
C
t P
H
t+1
pit+1
]
−Et
[
µCt ϕ1,HLTV
C
t P
H
t+1
pit+1
]
(10)
λCt = βCEt
[
λCt+1R
C
t
pit+1
]
+ µCt R
C
t (11)
where λCt and µ
C
t are the Lagrange multipliers, and pit is the gross inflation rate (pit =
Pt/Pt−1).
2.2 Unconstrained Households
The preferences of the representative unconstrained households are defined over consump-
tion CUt and an aggregator of real monetary assets xt, and are described by the infinite
stream of utility:
UUt =
∞∑
t=0
βtUu
U
(
CUt , xt
)
(12)
where βU is the intertemporal discount factor. In line with the existing literature, we
assume that βU < βC , so that agents with a lower discount factor are savers in equilibrium,
whereas agents with a higher discount factor are borrowers in equilibrium.
The instantaneous utility function of the representative unconstrained household uU
(
CUt , xt
)
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is given by:
uU
(
CUt , xt
)
=
(CUt − γCUt−1)1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
+ ηx log xt (13)
where ηx > 0. Drawing on Age´nor et al. (2012), the composite index of real monetary
assets xt is defined via a Cobb-Douglas function:
xt =
(
mUt
)v
d1−vt (14)
where mUt indicates real money balances, dt real deposits. v measures the importance of
real money balances in the liquidity bundle (0 < v < 1).10
Each unconstrained agent is subject to the following budget constraint:
BUt
PtRBt
+
MUt
Pt
+CUt +T
U
t +
Dt
Pt
+It(1+AC
I
t ) =
BUt−1
Pt
+
MUt−1
Pt
+
Dt−1RDt−1
Pt
+qtKt+(1−φB)ΩBt
(15)
Thus, unconstrained agents allocate their wealth among money holding MUt , deposits
Dt, which pay an interest R
D
t , and holding of zero-coupon government bonds B
U
t . They
receive rental income qtKt (where Kt is capital and qt the rental rate), and a fraction
(1− φB) of banks’ profits ΩBt . They also pay a real lump-sum tax TUt . It is investment.
Unconstrained households accumulate capital and rent it to firms. The law of motion
of capital stock is expressed in the following standard way:
Kt = It−1 + (1− δ)Kt−1 (16)
where δ represents the depreciation rate of the capital stock. In addition, unconstrained
10This formulation originates from a recent approach of modeling transaction services via CES bundles
of different assets. See, for example, Canzoneri et al. (2008, 2011).
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households face quadratic adjustment costs of investment as in Kim (2000):
ACIt =
φK
2
(
It
Kt
)2
(17)
where φK is the adjustment cost scale parameter for capital.
Unconstrained households maximize their lifetime utility (12), subject to the budget
constraint (15) and the capital accumulation equation (16). The first order necessary
conditions with respect to consumption, money, deposits, bonds, capital and investment
are respectively given by:
(CUt − γCUt−1)−1/σ − βUγEt
[
(CUt+1 − γCUt )−1/σ
]
= λUt (18)
ηxv
mUt
+ βUEt
[
λUt+1
pit+1
]
= λUt (19)
ηx(1− v)
dt
+ βUEt
[
λUt+1R
D
t
pit+1
]
= λUt (20)
βUEt
[
λUt+1
pit+1
]
=
λUt
RBt
(21)
βU(1− δ)Et
[
µUt+1
]
= µUt − λUt
(
qt + φK
(
It
Kt
)3)
(22)
βUEt
[
µUt+1
]
= λUt
(
1 +
3
2
φK
(
It
Kt
)2)
(23)
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where λUt and µ
U
t are the Lagrange multipliers.
2.3 Firms
The firms’ sector is modeled in a standard way. Each j-th firm produces and sells differ-
entiated final goods in a monopolistically competitive market. The production function
is a standard Cobb-Douglas with labor provided by constrained households and capital
by unconstrained households (i.e. the owners of firms):
Yt = AtK
α
t Ft
1−α − Φ (24)
where α is the share of capital used in production, and Φ is a fixed cost to ensure that
profits are zero in the steady-state. At is technology and follows an AR(1) process:
log
(
At
A
)
= φA log
(
At−1
A
)
+ εAt (25)
where εAt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and standard deviation σA.
Firms’ optimizing process is constrained by nominal rigidities a` la Rotemberg (1982),
i.e. firms face quadratic price adjustment costs:
ACPt =
φP
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− pi
)2
Yt (26)
Given the standard CES setting of equation (3), the demand function faced by each
single firm j is:
Yt(j) =
[
pt(j)
Pt
]−θt
Yt =⇒ Pt(j) =
[
Yt(j)
Yt
]− 1
θt
Pt (27)
Thus, the demand function for each single good j is proportionally related to the output
level of the economy, and negatively to the price of good j.
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Following Kim (2000), the profit function for each firm j is:
PtΠt(j) = Pt(j)Yt(j)− PtwtFt(j)− PtqtKt(j)− PtACPt (28)
After employing (26) and (27) into (28), the maximization problem of each firm becomes
fully dynamic: each firm maximizes the expectation of the discounted sum of profit flows,
given the information at time 0:
Π0(j) = E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
ρtPtΠt(j)
]
(29)
where ρ is the discount factor of firms.
By assuming that each agent in the economy has access to a complete market for
contingent claims, the discount factors of unconstrained households and firms are equal:
Et
[
ρt+1
ρt
]
= βUEt
[
λUt+1
λUt
]
(30)
Therefore, the necessary first order conditions of the maximization problem with respect
to labor and capital are given respectively by:
wt = (1− α)
(
Yt + Φ
Ft
)(
1− 1
eYt
)
(31)
qt = α
(
Yt + Φ
Kt
)(
1− 1
eYt
)
(32)
where eYt is the output demand elasticity:
1
eYt
=
1
θ
{
1− φP (pit − pi)pit + βUφPEt
[
λUt+1
λUt
(pit+1 − pi)pi2t+1
Yt+1
Yt
]}
(33)
which measures the gross price markup over marginal cost. It is easy to check that
manipulations of the log-linearized version of (33) lead to the standard New Keynesian
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Phillips curve.
2.4 Banks
The banking sector is characterized by a continuum of banks facing perfect competition.11
Banks borrow from the central bank LCBt at the rate R
CB
t (i.e. the policy rate) and receive
deposits Dt from unconstrained households (liability side of the balance sheet), invest in
government bonds BBt and provide loans to constrained households L
C
t (asset side of the
balance sheet). Thus, the balance sheet identity of the representative bank is given by:
BBt + L
C
t = Zt +Dt + L
CB
t
(34)
where Zt represents the equity (net worth, capital) of the bank.
Each bank maximizes the present discounted value of its profits:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βB[
RCt L
C
t
Pt
− L
C
t+1
Pt
+
RBt B
B
t
Pt
− B
B
t+1
Pt
− R
D
t Dt
Pt
+
Dt+1
Pt
− Zt
Pt
+
Zt+1
Pt
−
− R
CB
t L
CB
t
Pt
+
LCBt+1
Pt
− e
2
(
wCt L
C
t + w
G
t B
B
t
Zt
− νb
)2
Zt
Pt
− γ
C
2
(
LCt
Pt
)2
]
(35)
where βB is the discount factor of banks. The second to last term in (35) represents a
quadratic cost that banks pay in terms of their equity whenever they move away from a
leverage ratio νb (i.e. assets over equity) imposed by regulators. The presence of these
costs is justified by the recent experience of many advanced economies, where authorities
have proposed to introduce a leverage ratio as a regulatory tool. By modifying the
imposed leverage ratio, it is possible to assess the impact of a stricter or looser macro-
prudential policy.12 The presence of capital requirements combined with a balance sheet
identity like (34) has important implications for the dynamics of the model. In fact,
any economic disturbance that affects banks’ balance sheet composition forces financial
11An extension with monopolistic competition a` la Gerali et al. (2010) is left for future research.
12For simplicity, we do not distinguish between required capital and countercyclical capital buffers
held voluntarily by banks. For a discussion, see Angelini et al. (2010). Moreover, we do not introduce a
countercyclical capital requirements rule as in Angelini et al. (2011).
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intermediaries to modify their leverage, leading to shifts in the supply of credit. As
highlighted by Adrian and Shin (2010a), this transmission channel played a crucial role
in the recent crisis. The last term in equation (35) captures an additional cost of managing
loans to households.
Drawing on Roger and Vlcˇek (2011), the leverage ratio incorporates two different
risk weights for loans to households (wCt ) and government bonds (w
G
t ). These variables
can be considered proxies for the perception of the risk embedded in the asset side of
the balance sheet of banks. The time-varying risk weights aim at capturing the nature
of risk-sensitive regulatory frameworks such as Basel II and Basel III. We propose the
following novel formulation for the two risk weights:
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where ϕ1,wG , ϕ1,wC , ϕ2,wC ≥ 0, ϕ2,wG , ϕ3,wC ≤ 0, and κB = YB , κL = P
HH
LCRC
, and κZ =
Z
LC
.
φwG and φwC are autoregressive parameter (0 < (φwG , φwC ) < 1). ε
wG
t and ε
wC
t are i.i.d.
shocks with zero mean and standard deviation σwG and σwC , respectively.
The intuition behind (36) and (37) is as follows. Equation (36) models the risk
associated with government debt. This risk is assumed to increase with government’s
total debt exposure (Bt/Yt). The first term in the right-hand side of (37) represents a
proxy for the leverage position of constrained households, expressed as the ratio between
the value of loans and the value of household’s collateral: the higher is this ratio, the
higher is the perceived risk associated with LCt . The second term indicates the risk
embedded in the balance sheet of banks: the perceived risk is an increasing function of
the ratio between the amount of loans provided to households and the equity of banks.
Thus, the sign of ϕ1,wC and ϕ2,wC in our calibration suggests that the risk increases as the
leverage of households and the exposure of banks increase. Lastly, both equations feature
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a component related to the macroeconomic situation capturing systemic risk. Notice that
if wGt and w
C
t are assumed to be fixed and equal to 1 (as in the steady-state situation),
the leverage cost in equation (35) boils down to the more standard formulation usually
adopted in the literature.
Equation (35) highlights another source of financing for banks (besides deposits from
unconstrained households), namely loans from the central bank. Since this reflects stan-
dard lending facilities usually provided for by monetary authorities, banks are required to
offer collateral. Therefore, similarly to what seen for constrained households, each bank
is subject to a borrowing constraint:
RCBt L
CB
t
Pt
≤ φCBB LTV CBB,t Et
[
BBt
RBt+1Pt+1
]
+ φCBC LTV
CB
C,t Et
[
LCt
RCt+1Pt+1
]
(38)
Thus, equation (38) introduces a collateralized lending market between banks and the cen-
tral bank. Both government bonds (the first term on the right-hand side) and mortgage-
backed securities (the second term on the right-hand side) can be considered as general
collateral. The parameters φCBB and φ
CB
C indicate the importance of each component
(φCBB + φ
CB
C = 1). Notice that usual standard lending facilities do not allow banks to use
asset-backed securities as eligible collateral. Therefore, in the baseline calibration, the
parameter φCBC has been set to a low level (0.1). By varying φ
CB
C it is possible to simulate
some recent measures implemented by central banks that extend the range of possible
collaterals.13
LTV CBB,t and LTV
CB
C,t resemble the haircuts applied to the collateral pledged against
the credit provided by the central bank to private banks. Although central banks’ haircuts
are officially fixed, we assume them to be time-varying, since they reflect the underlying
risk associated with the collateral. For instance, a downgrading of the eligible collaterals
may result in a lower haircut category. Thus, also in this case, the LTV ratios determining
the liquidity of the system are endogenized. More specifically, LTV CBB,t and LTV
CB
C,t are
13This analysis is not conducted in the present paper.
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expressed in the following way:
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where κD =
D
LC
, and φLTV CBB and φLTV CBC are autoregressive parameters, 0 < (φLTV CBB , φLTV CBC ) <
1. In (39) and (40) we have that ϕ1,B, ϕ1,C , ϕ2,C < 0 and ϕ2,B, ϕ3,C > 0. ε
LTV CBB
t and
ε
LTV CBC
t are i.i.d. shocks with zero mean and standard deviation σLTV CBB and σLTV CBC ,
respectively. The same reasoning behind equations (36) and (37) applies here too. There-
fore, we assume that the LTV ratio associated with government bonds is a function of
the proxies for the systemic risk of the economy, while the LTV ratio relative to loans to
households is a function of proxies for both idiosyncratic risk of households and banks,
and the systemic risk of the economy.
As in Gerali et al. (2010), the law of motion of equity stock is given by:
Zt = (1− δb)Zt−1 + φBΩBt−1 (41)
where δb represents the cost of managing bank capital (it is analogous to the depreciation
rate of physical capital), and (1−φB) summarizes the dividend policy of the bank, which
is assumed to be exogenous. Financial intermediaries can accumulate net worth only
through retained earnings.
By substituting the definition of Zt+1 obtained from (34) forwarded one period into
(35), the latter boils down to a one-period profits equation, and the maximization problem
19
becomes static. Expected real profits at the end of period t are thus defined as:
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Banks maximize their profits (42) subject to the balance sheet identity (34) and to the
borrowing constraint (38). In order to simplify the maximization problem, we proceed as
follows. We isolate BBt from equation (34) and substitute for it wherever it appears in
the Lagrangian. Since banks behave competitively, they take the path of all the interest
rates as given. Thus, the choice variables for banks are the quantities of deposits, loans to
households, equity, and loans from the central bank. The first order necessary conditions
with respect to deposits, loans to households, equity, and loans from the central bank are
the following:
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where µBt is the Lagrange multiplier.
2.5 The Government Sector
The consolidated government-central bank budget constraint is given by:
Bt
PtRBt
+
Mt
Pt
+
LCBt
Pt
+ Tt =
Bt−1
Pt
+
Mt−1
Pt
+
LCBt−1R
CB
t−1
Pt
+Gt (47)
where Bt is the stock of government interest-bearing debt held by the public (Bt =
BBt + B
U
t ), and Mt is the total amount of money held by the public (Mt = M
C
t + M
U
t ).
Government spending, net of interest expenses, Gt follows an AR(1) process:
log
(
Gt
G
)
= φG log
(
Gt−1
G
)
+ εGt (48)
where εGt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and standard deviation σG.
We introduce a passive fiscal policy rule, whereby the total amount of tax collection is
a function of total government’s liabilities, in order to prevent the emergence of inflation
as a fiscal phenomenon, as suggested by Leeper (1991):
Tt = ψ0 + ψ1
[
bt−1
pit
− b
pi
]
(49)
where ψ0 is the steady-state level of Tt. Equation (49) indicates that the level of taxes
reacts to deviations of the outstanding level of public debt from its steady-state level. In
other words, taxes are not allowed to act independently from the stock of government
liabilities outstanding in the economy.
Besides providing loans to banks, the monetary authority sets the policy rate, which
is assumed to be the rate on central bank’s loans to private banks RCBt , according to the
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following Taylor (1993) rule:
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where αR, αpi, αY indicate the response of R
CB
t to the lagged policy rate, inflation and
output, respectively. Thus, the policy rate is determined by the deviation of inflation and
output from the steady-state with an interest rate smoothing component. The monetary
policy shock εRt is an i.i.d. with zero mean and standard deviation σR.
2.6 The Resource Constraint and Aggregation
The model is completed by specifying the aggregated variables for consumption, money,
bonds and taxes:
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and the resource constraint of the economy:
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Total output is allocated to consumption, government spending, investment (comprehen-
sive of capital adjustment costs), price adjustment costs, and a component related to
banking sector’s frictions.
The model is composed of 43 equations for 43 variables. Since the equilibrium of the
model cannot be solved analytically, we log-linearized it around the steady-state. We
solved the model using both the MATLAB routine Gensys written by Christopher Sims
and Dynare developed by Adjemian et al. (2011).14 In what follows, calibration issues
are first discussed. We then analyze the properties of the model, highlighting the main
results.
2.7 The Calibration
The benchmark model is calibrated to match euro area quarterly data over the decade
prior to the crisis of 2008. Table 1 and Table 2 report, respectively, some steady-state
values and the chosen calibration values for the standard parameters. Some of the steady-
states are obtained from the data, or following previous studies. Output is normalized to
1. In the steady-state, 10 percent of consumption is attributed to constrained households,
while 90 percent to unconstrained households (Gerali et al., 2010). The same ratio is
assumed for taxes. The aggregate consumption-output ratio has been set to 0.4, and the
taxes-output ratio to 0.1972. The ratio of market to non-market activities is set equal to
0.3, whereas the stock of capital-output ratio to 8. The steady-state value of the gross
money market rate has been chosen equal to 1.015, which implies a gross inflation rate
of around 1.004.
Following Gerali et al. (2010), we set LTV C at 0.7, a value in line with the evidence
for mortgages in the euro area reported by Calza et al. (2007). LTV CBB is set at 0.9,
consistently with the average levels of valuation haircuts applied by the ECB to eligible
marketable central government debt instruments. LTV CBC is assumed to exhibit a lower
steady-state value, namely 0.8. We choose a steady-state value for the housing stock
14The codes are available upon request as well as the appendices reporting the deterministic steady-
state and the log-linearized model.
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equal to 1.
Some parameters are chosen following previous studies and their calibrated value is
quite standard in the literature. Among them: the elasticity of substitution across goods
θ, set equal to 6 (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004); the habit formation parameter γ, set
equal to 0.7 (Smets and Wouters, 2007); the elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ,
set equal to 0.5, which implies a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2; the depreciation
rate of capital δ calibrated to 0.025 (Christiano et al., 2005; Altig et al., 2011), which
implies an annual rate of depreciation on capital equal to 10 percent; the share of capital
in the production function α, set to 0.36 (Christiano et al., 2005; Altig et al., 2011);
the parameter of the price adjustment cost φP , calibrated to 100 (Ireland, 2004); the
elasticity of real money balances χ, set equal to 7; the Frisch elasticity ψ, set equal
to 1. The discount factor of constrained and unconstrained households is calibrated to
0.9943 and 0.9923, respectively. The preference parameter of the liquidity aggregator ηx
is set at 0.3 in order to pin down a reasonable steady-state level of deposits and money
balances of unconstrained households. The share parameter v in the liquidity aggregator
index, which indicate the relative share of money in the liquidity bundle, is set equal to
0.2 (Age´nor et al., 2012). The parameters of the fiscal and monetary policy rules are
calibrated in a standard way, with αR set equal to 0.7, αpi to 1.5, αY to zero, and ψ1 to
0.3.
The fraction of bank capital reinvested φB is assumed to be 0.9, while the costs of
managing loans to households is chosen equal to 0.01. The cost associated with the
leverage requirement is set equal to 0.1 (Gerali et al., 2010).
The AR coefficients and the standard deviations of the shocks are set to φA = 0.95,
φG = 0.90, σA = 0.01, σR = 0.005, σG = 0.012, σPH = 0.1 (see, for example, Christiano
and Eichenbaum, 1992; Kim, 2000; Andre´s et al., 2004; Altig et al., 2011). φPH is set
equal to 0.8 after regressing on its first lag actual quarterly data of housing prices in the
euro area over the period 2003-2008.
There is little guidance in the literature on how to set the parameters of the LTV
ratios and risk weights. Therefore, we adopt the following calibration strategy. We set
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these parameters so as to match actual correlations among LTV ratios and risk weights,
and their determinants. In other words, the correlations of our simulated variables have
to be approximately identical to the actual ones reported in Table 3, and calculated
using euro area data obtained from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and Thomson
Reuters Datastream. Table 4 reports the resulting calibration for the parameters. We
choose the autoregressive parameters by regressing the actual series of our proxies for the
LTV ratios on their first lag. The standard deviations of the shocks to the LTV ratios
and risk weights have been set equal to 0.1.
Lastly, the values of the remaining parameters and steady-states are computed using
the deterministic steady-state solution.
2.7.1 A Strategy for Modeling the Basel Accords
Thanks to the novel formulation of the weighted leverage cost, the model allows us to
distinguish different prudential regulatory regimes by adequately changing capital require-
ments and risk weight measures. In the baseline calibration of the model, the economy
is assumed to be subjected to a regulatory framework similar to Basel III. Therefore, we
set the steady-state ratio of bank capital Z to total assets (BB + LC) at 0.13, the value
imposed by Basel III. For this purpose, we need to set the cost of managing bank capital
δb at 0.021. The other regime considered in the analysis (Basel II ) requires a leverage
ratio equal to 0.08, which implies δb equal to 0.035.
The parameters of equation (36) and equation (37) are then exploited to further distin-
guish the different regimes. Besides imposing capital requirements, Basel II strengthened
the role of systemic risk in comparison with previous regulatory frameworks. Angelini
et al. (2010) and Angelini et al. (2012) model a risk-based Basel II mechanism by in-
troducing time-varying weights expressed as a function of output deviations from the
steady-state. The role played by financial intermediaries in the recent financial crisis
reinforced the concerns about the inadequacy of risk measures based solely on coun-
tercyclical systemic elements. Therefore, authorities proposed a new regulatory regime,
Basel III, which in fact considers a wider set of risk-sensitive capital requirements (Basel
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Committee and others, 2009; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). The new
framework emphasizes even more that the amount of capital banks must hold is also
determined by the riskiness of each particular borrower. As the risk of a specific asset
increases, banks are forced to hold a larger amount of capital (Aguiar and Drumond,
2007). In light of these considerations, and differently from the model by Angelini et al.
(2012), our risk weights depend also on the time-varying riskiness embedded in the bal-
ance sheet of banks. As a result, our richer setting is able to capture, at least to a first
approximation, the broader definition of risk introduced with Basel III. In particular,
including proxies for counterparties’ (i.e. households and government) credit risk is a
way to model the interrelationship between risk-perception and the risk weights present
in the leverage requirement imposed by regulators on financial intermediaries.
In light of these considerations, the Basel II regime is modeled by setting to zero the
parameters ϕ1,wG , ϕ1,wC and ϕ2,wC . Lastly, a No Basel regime is considered by assuming
that risk weights are time-invariant. Table 5 summarizes the calibration strategy chosen
for the different regulatory frameworks.
3 The Results
As highlighted in previous sections, the model exhibits a quite high degree of complexity.
In order to retain tractability, in this paper we focus on a few set of well-defined issues,
leaving for future research the study of further questions that may be potentially tackled
using this framework. More precisely, in this paper we first show the implications of
having endogenous loan-to-value ratios (paragraph 3.1), and then we compare the effec-
tiveness of different prudential regulatory regimes in affecting business cycle fluctuations
and restoring macroeconomic and financial stability (paragraph 3.2).
Table 6 reports the shocks present in the model economy, distinguishing between stan-
dard macroeconomic shocks, financial shocks and risk weight shocks. This classification
is used extensively in the next paragraphs. Figure 2 reports graphically the main chan-
nels at work when the economy is hit by a contractionary monetary policy shock. As it
can be easily generalized to other types of disturbances, it will guide us throughout the
26
following pages.
3.1 Exogenous vs Endogenous LTV Ratios
Endogenous and time-varying loan-to-value ratios for households and banks represent
one of the salient features of model. Inspired by the empirical evidence, we have derived
a novel formulation of LTV ratios that combines both specific risk factors and a coun-
tercyclical element. The first issue we need to address regards the implications of the
presence of such endogenous constraints for the main dynamics of the model. To this
purpose, we report the impulse response functions to standard macroeconomic shocks,
comparing the cases of endogenous versus exogenous loan-to-value ratio of households
(LTV Ct ).
15 We perform this exercise using the baseline calibration, which reflects, as
already mentioned, a Basel III scenario. All the impulse response functions reported in
the paper represent percentage deviations from the steady-state.
We focus on six main variables: four standard variable that are standard in the
literature (total amount of lending to constrained households, lending rate, output and
bank equity) and two banking specific variables, which allow us to obtain a deeper insight
on the effects of capital regulation on banks’ balance sheet. These are the bank leverage,
defined as the ratio of assets over equity, and a risk ratio, defined as the ratio of loans to
households and bonds held by banks, introduced to better evaluate how the composition
of the asset side of banks’ balance sheet changes over time.
Figure 3 reports the impulse response functions to a contractionary monetary policy
shock. In line with standard DSGE models, an exogenous increase in the policy rate
causes a negative effect on investment, which leads to a contraction of output. However,
within this setting, we have further channels through which a monetary policy shock
propagates to the economy. In particular, we observe a reduction in the total amount of
loans to constrained households due to the combined effect of a higher lending rate and
lower housing prices. Since banks are subject to a leverage cost, the drop in households
15Exogenous refers to LTV Ct following a simple AR process of order 1. In other words, ϕ1,H = ϕ2,H =
ϕ3,H = 0. The graphs relative to the other shocks and to banking loan-to-value ratios (LTV
CB
B,t and
LTV CBC,t ) are available upon request.
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lending leads banks to increase their holding of government bonds. As a result, the
risk ratio exhibits a substantial decrease, whereas bank capital increases by around 0.6
percent.
Visual inspection of Figures 3 also suggests that modeling endogenous variations of
LTVC,t (blue dashed line) amplifies the effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock.
Worsened economic conditions increase the collateral requirement for constrained house-
holds, i.e. their borrowing capacity is reduced. More specifically, downward movements
in output, house prices and wages generate an endogenous reduction in the LTV of con-
strained households, which magnifies the drop in total lending. Thus, these findings show
that the model is able to reproduce a realistic situation, in which worsened credit market
conditions arise from an endogenous tightening of lending requirements.
Turning to a positive technology innovation (Figure 4), it is possible to observe in
both cases an increase in real output and better credit conditions for households due
to a lower interest rate on loans. With endogenous collateral constraints, the overall
improvement of both households’ idiosyncratic conditions and general economic outlook
looses the collateral requirement of constrained households, generating a substantially
larger increase in the amount of loans provided by banks to households. As a consequence,
also the exposure of banks (i.e. ratio risk) exhibits a larger increase. The procyclical
dynamics of credit are thus amplified.
Monetary and technology shocks feature procyclical lending, and, therefore, endoge-
nous LTV ratios generate an amplification effect for credit conditions. However, a gov-
ernment spending shock (Figure 5) leads to a general increase in interest rates, which,
in turn, causes a fall in loans to households. In this case, lending is anticyclical, and the
presence of a time-varying constraint mitigates the negative effect on total loan quan-
tities. In particular, the lower value of the collateral needed by households reflects the
overall improvement of the economic conditions following an expansionary fiscal policy
shock. The smaller reduction in lending leads to lower volatility also in the asset side
composition of banks.
These findings clearly indicate that the presence of endogenous LTV ratios exacerbates
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the procyclicality of lending conditions, revealing that our model exhibits better business
cycle properties compared to similar settings with exogenous LTV ratios. The greater
volatility generated within our setting would require in principle incisive countercyclical
measures to prevent excessive fluctuations of business cycles. These issues are partially
covered in the next paragraphs.
3.2 Comparing No Basel with Basel III
In this sub-section we compare the results of our baseline model, which reflects a Basel
III regime, and those obtained from a specification still featuring endogenous constraints,
but no capital requirement and risk weight measures (labeled No Basel). Figures 6-8
plot the impulse response functions to the three standard macroeconomic shocks. First
of all, it should be noted that the difference in the prudential regimes does not reflect
any substantial dissimilarity in the response of output. The negligible impact on the
macroeconomy is consistent with the findings of other studies (De Walque et al., 2010;
Angelini et al., 2010, 2012), and in this model is probably exacerbated by the absence of
borrowing firms.
In addition, we find that the presence of a prudential regime like Basel III increases
the procyclical nature of credit. The procyclicality of risk-based capital regulatory frame-
works is well documented in the literature (Aguiar and Drumond, 2007; Angelini et al.,
2010; Parie`s et al., 2011),16 and is due to the fact that credit risk itself is procyclical.
Our simulated Basel III regime amplifies the response of the quantity of total lending
to households after a shock in all three cases. By contrast, Basel III is effective in
dampening the volatility of both the risk- and leverage position of banks in comparison
with the No Basel regime. Following a contractionary monetary policy shock (Figure
6), the combination of tighter capital requirements and worsening economic conditions
(which increases the riskiness of banks’ assets) forces banks to reduce their leverage ratio
generating a deeper contraction in the loan supply. The resulting reduction in the size
of the asset side of banks’ balance sheet leads banks to raise aggressively the lending
16See Drumond (2009) for a review of the most recent studies.
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rate. Higher borrowing costs faced by constrained households contribute eventually to
increase banks’ net worth. The key role played by time-varying risk weights is confirmed
by considering the responses to productivity and government spending shocks (Figure 7
and Figure 8, respectively). In the first case, for instance, improved economic conditions
induce risk weights to decline, making loans less risky. In order to meet the required
leverage ratio, banks have to further expand loan supply by reducing the interest rate on
loans. These findings corroborate the hypothesis that risk-based capital requirements, as
those proposed by Basel III, sharpen the procyclical nature of credit when the economy
is mainly affected by standard macroeconomic shocks. The countercyclical risk weights
induce financial intermediaries to hold excessive equity during economic contractions and
too less during economic expansions.
We then investigate the properties of the two regulatory frameworks by observing
the patterns of the impulse response functions to two financial shocks, namely a credit
crunch shock and a negative housing price shock. The first one, adopted following Andre´s
and Arce (2012), consists in an exogenous shock to the pledgeability ratio LTV Ct that
reduces the borrowing capacity of households. The second shock is an exogenous negative
disturbance on house prices: since the real value of houses is used by households as
collateral, a decrease in the price of houses leads to a reduction in the quantity of loans
that households are able to receive from banks. Thus, the effects of the two shocks are
expected to be qualitatively very similar. Figure 9 and Figure 10 report the impulse
response functions.
In line with what found for macroeconomic shocks, the volatility of the risk- and
leverage position of banks is substantially lower under a Basel III regime. However, the
other results are in sharp contrast with those obtained observing the economy reacting to
standard macroeconomic shocks. In fact, now Basel III seems to be capable of mitigating
significantly the negative response of both output and lending quantity. The higher
capital requirements and the broader set of risk proxies provided for by Basel III reduce
the negative spillovers from the financial sector to the economy. The intuition is as
follows. Unlike standard macroeconomic shocks, financial shocks have a direct impact
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on the quantity of loans. The immediate reduction of credit to households induces risk
weights to decrease, given that the exposure of households and banks decreases and more
than offsets the reduction in aggregate output. Since loans are now less risky, to satisfy
the imposed capital requirements the reduction of loan supply has not to be as substantial
as in the No Basel case. The gains from having a mitigated effect on credit is paid for
by higher volatility of the interest rate on loans.
Lastly, we compare the standard deviation of the simulated variables of the baseline
model and the specification No Basel. The third, fifth and seventh columns of Table 7
report the standard deviation ratios of the simulated variables when using, respectively,
all the shocks present in the model, only the macro shocks, and only the financial shocks.
The numbers are computed as the standard deviation implied by Basel III divided by
the standard deviation generated by No Basel. Thus, a value larger (smaller) than one
indicates that the volatility of the simulated variables under the Basel III regime is
larger (smaller) than that obtained under a No Basel framework. The results confirm that
when the economy is hit by all the shocks, Basel III increases the volatility of lending and
output compared with the case without prudential regulations. Not surprisingly, the same
considerations hold when the economy is affected only by standard macroeconomic shocks.
However, in a situation in which only financial shocks are at work, namely when the
economy is in a period of financial stress, Basel III is effective in downsizing substantially
the volatility of loan quantity and output. The fact that risk-based prudential regulations
seem to work properly only during periods of extraordinary financial stress is consistent
with the results of Angelini et al. (2012).
3.3 Comparing Basel II with Basel III
We now compare the baseline regulatory framework Basel III with its predecessor Basel
II, as specified in sub-section 2.7.1. The impulse response functions of the three standard
macroeconomic shocks (Figures 11-13) indicate that Basel III is able to generate a lower
volatility in the risk- and leverage position of banks than Basel II. As far as the remaining
variables are concerned, the responses of the two regimes are very close and, in the case
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of a positive technology shock, even amplified under Basel III, suggesting that Basel III
may potentially be more procyclical than Basel II during normal times. This can be
attributed to the presence of additional risk weight proxies in the Basel III specification,
which reinforce the fluctuations of risk associated with loans to households.
The ratios of the standard deviation of the simulated variables under the regime Basel
II with respect to the No Basel case are reported in the second, fourth and sixth columns
of Table 7.17 The findings corroborate the idea that, regardless of the type of shocks
hitting the economy, Basel III amplifies the volatility of loan quantities in comparison
with Basel II, whereas mitigates the fluctuations in aggregate output and the risk- and
leverage position of banks. The magnitude of these differences is nevertheless relatively
small.
These results are confirmed, and, to some extent, strengthened when we add to the
simulation exercise the two risk weight shocks, which increase exogenously the risk per-
ception of loans to households (wC) and government bonds (wG). Table 8 shows the
standard deviation ratios of Basel III with respect to Basel II. As in the previous para-
graph, a value larger than unity indicates that the volatility of the simulated variable
under Basel III is higher than under Basel II. The main conclusion that can be drawn
from this analysis is that a regulatory regime like Basel III seems to be generally more
effective than Basel II in reducing the volatility of aggregate output and the risk- and
leverage position of banks, whereas Basel II is able to stabilize more incisively credit
fluctuations.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a new theoretical framework to study the interactions between finan-
cial markets and the rest of the economy. The model formalizes the ideas that banking
assets are risky and LTV ratios are not constant and depend on systemic factors and lever-
age conditions of households and banks. Hence, the model is capable of a) reproducing in
17The impulse responses to financial and risk weight shocks are not reproduce herein, but are available
upon request.
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a realistic way credit procyclical properties; b) distinguishing different prudential regula-
tory frameworks by modifying the configuration of the key parameters and steady-states
of the model.
The results of our study indicate that endogenous LTV ratios magnify the effect
of procyclical lending, and thus the effects of a simulated credit crunch. We have also
shown the implications of different prudential regulatory measures. When standard macro
shocks prevail (i.e. in normal times), prudential regulatory frameworks such as Basel
II and Basel III increase the volatility of credit and macroeconomic variables. When
financial shocks prevail (i.e. in periods of extraordinary financial stress) Basel II and
Basel III contribute substantially to stabilize credit markets and the overall economy.
Moreover, Basel III is generally more effective in doing so than Basel II. These findings
are very important for policy-makers struggling to find effective tools to smooth business
cycle fluctuations and restore macroeconomic and financial stability.
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Tables
Table 1: Steady-state values
Notation Description SS values
Y Output 1
L/(1− L) Ratio of market to non-market activities 0.3
K/Y Stock of capital-GDP ratio 8
C/Y Total consumption-GDP ratio 0.4
CC/Y Consumption-GDP ratio CH 0.1 ∗ C
CU/Y Consumption-GDP ratio UH 0.9 ∗ C
T/Y Taxes-GDP ratio 0.1972
TC/Y Taxes-GDP ratio CH 0.1 ∗ T
TU/Y Taxes-GDP ratio UH 0.9 ∗ T
RCB Gross money-market rate 1.015
LTV C Loan-to value ratio households 0.7
LTV CBB Loan-to value ratio banks - gov. bonds 0.9
LTV CBC Loan-to value ratio banks - loans to HH 0.8
H Stock of housing 1
Notes: CH indicates constrained households; UH indicates unconstrained households.
40
Table 2: Benchmark calibration of the standard parameters (Basel III)
Notation Description Benchmark values
Preferences and technology
α Share of capital in the production function 0.36
βC Intertemporal discount factor of CH 0.9943
βU Intertemporal discount factor of UH 0.9923
σ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.5
χ Elasticity of money demand 7
ψ Elasticity of labor supply 1
γ Habit formation 0.7
θ Elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods 6
φP Price adjustment costs 100
v Elasticity of money in the liquidity aggregator 0.2
ηx Elasticity of liquidity in the utility function of UH 0.3
Fiscal and monetary policy
ψ0 Fiscal policy constant 0.1972
ψ1 Fiscal policy response to b 0.3
αpi Monetary policy response to inflation 1.5
αY Monetary policy response to output 0
αR Monetary policy inertia 0.7
Banking sector
δb Cost of managing bank capital 0.021
φB Profits reinvested in bank capital 0.9
γC Cost of managing loans 0.01
e Leverage ratio cost 0.1
Autoregressive parameters
φA Technology shock 0.95
φG Government spending shock 0.90
φPH Housing prices shock 0.80
Standard deviations
σA Technology shock 0.01
σG Government spending shock 0.012
σR Monetary policy shock 0.005
σPH Housing prices shock 0.1
Notes: CH indicates constrained households; UH indicates unconstrained households.
41
Table 3: Actual correlations between LTVs and risk weights and their determinants
LTV Ct LTV
CB
B,t w
G
t LTV
CB
C,t w
C
t
PHt 0.624 - - - -
wtFt 0.576 - - - -
Yt 0.716 0.441 -0.441 0.702 -0.702
Bt - -0.286 0.286 - -
(LCt R
C
t )/P
H
t - - - 0.578 -0.578
LCt /Dt - - - 0.442 -
LCt /Zt - - - - -0.208
Sources: Authors’ elaborations on data from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and Datastream.
Notes: All the variables are expressed as quarterly percentage changes over the period 2003-2012
(except for LTV CBB,t , which is only available from 2008). LTV
C
t is proxied by the opposite of the
net percentage of banks reporting a tightening of the loan-to-value ratio of loans for house purchases
over the previous quarter (Question 10 of the Bank Lending Survey). wGt is proxied by the sovereign
CDS spread of Germany. wCt is proxied by the net percentage of banks reporting a tightening of
collateral requirements for loans for house purchases over the previous quarter (Question 10 of the
Bank Lending Survey). LTV CBB,t and LTV
CB
C,t are the opposite of w
G
t and w
C
t , respectively. P
H
t is
residential property prices of new and existing dwellings. wt is hourly compensation. Ft is total
employment in hours. Yt is GDP at market price. Bt is general government debt. L
C
t is lending for
house purchase (over five years). RCt is the interest rate on loans for house purchase. Dt is deposit
liabilities. Zt is capital and reserves. For the computation of the correlations, the quantity of housing
ht has been considered fixed.
Table 4: Benchmark calibration of the parameters of LTV ratios and risk weights
Notation Description Benchmark values
Exog. LTVs Endog. LTVs
LTV Ct
ϕ1,H Elasticity of LTV
C
t wrt the value of housing - 0.02
ϕ2,H Elasticity of LTV
C
t wrt to labor income - 0.02
ϕ3,H Elasticity of LTV
C
t wrt to output - 2
φLTV C AR parameter - 0.8
LTV CBB,t
ϕ1,B Elasticity of LTV
CB
B,t wrt total government debt - -0.2
ϕ2,B Elasticity of LTV
CB
B,t wrt output - 0.5
φLTV CB
B
AR parameter - 0.2
LTV CBC,t
ϕ1,C Elasticity of LTV
CB
C,t wrt the ratio value of loans-value of housing - -0.01
ϕ2,C Elasticity of LTV
CB
C,t wrt the loan-to-deposit ratio - -0.005
ϕ3,C Elasticity of LTV
CB
C,t wrt output - 2
φLTV CB
C
AR parameter - 0.8
Sovereign bond risk wGt
ϕ1,wG Elasticity of w
G
t wrt total government debt 0.25 0.25
ϕ2,wG Elasticity of w
G
t wrt output -0.5 -0.5
φwG AR parameter 0.2 0.2
Households’ loans risk wCt
ϕ1,wC Elasticity of w
C
t wrt the ratio value of loans-value of housing 0.01 0.01
ϕ2,wC Elasticity of w
C
t wrt the loans to capital ratio 0.01 0.01
ϕ3,wC Elasticity of w
C
t wrt output -2 -2
φwC AR parameter 0.8 0.8
Standard deviations
σLTV
C
Shock to LTV Ct 0.1 0.1
σw
G
Shock to wGt 0.1 0.1
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Table 5: Model specifications of the Basel Accords
wGt w
C
t
 Regime Z
LC+BB
ϕ1,wG ϕ2,wG ϕ1,wC ϕ2,wC ϕ3,wC
No Basel No min. req. x x x x x
Basel II 0.08 x X x x X
Basel III 0.13 X X X X X
Table 6: Classification of shocks
Macroeconomic shocks Financial shocks Risk weight shocks
εA Technology shock εLTV
C
Credit crunch shock εw
C
MBS risk shock
εR Monetary policy shock εLTV
CB
B Sovereign debt downgrading shock εw
G
Sovereign risk shock
εG Government spending shock εLTV
CB
B MBS downgrading shock
εP
H
Housing prices shock
Table 7: Standard deviation of the simulated variables without risk weight shocks
All shocks Only macro shocks Only financial shocks
Endog. LTVs BII BIII BII BIII BII BIII
LCt 1.234 1.327 1.294 1.406 0.772 0.809
LCt /B
B
t 1.523 0.901 2.164 1.374 0.490 0.245
(LCt +B
B
t )/Zt 0.081 0.045 0.080 0.043 0.003 0.026
Yt 1.054 1.045 1.011 1.002 0.643 0.561
Notes: Standard deviation ratios of Basel II and Basel III with respect to No Basel
(SDBII/SDNB , SDBIII/SDNB).
Table 8: Standard deviation of the simulated variables with risk weight shocks
All shocks Macro + Weights shocks Financial + Weights shocks Only weights shocks
Endog. LTVs BIII BIII BIII BIII
LCt 1.048 1.184 1.020 1.271
LCt /B
B
t 0.526 0.673 0.496 0.458
(LCt +B
B
t )/Zt 0.519 0.548 0.533 0.517
Yt 0.982 1.056 0.902 0.947
Notes: Standard deviation ratios of Basel III with respect to Basel II (SDBIII/SDBII).
43
Figures
Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the main connections of the model
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Figure 2: The effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock


SHOCKR ↑, RB ↑
uu ((vv
!!



MACROECONOMY(Y ↓, w ↓, pi ↓ . . . )



Q ↓
LTV C(Y,Q,h,w,F )




D ↑↓
ll



LC ↓ LTV CBC (Y,LC ,Q)//
--



LCB ↑↓




BB ↑↓LTV CBB (Y,B)oo
qq



ΩB ↓↑




ENDOGENOUS
LTV RATIOS ↓
LTV C ,LTV CBC ,LTV
CB
B



Z ↓↑



Determination oflending rate RC ↑




ENDOGENOUS
RISK WEIGHTS ↑
wC , wG



WEIGHTEDLEVERAGE COST //
44
++



Feedback onbank profits ΩB ↓↑



Feedback on themacroeconomy

  
		
qq
//
44
Figure 3: Impulse response functions to a contractionary monetary policy shock
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions to a positive technology shock
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions to a government spending shock
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions to a contractionary monetary policy shock
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions to a positive technology shock
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Figure 8: Impulse response functions to a government spending shock
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Figure 9: Impulse response functions to a credit crunch shock
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Figure 10: Impulse response functions to negative housing price shock
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Figure 11: Impulse response functions to a contractionary monetary policy shock
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Figure 12: Impulse response functions to a positive technology shock
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Figure 13: Impulse response functions to a government spending shock
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